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INTRODUCTION
In 1989, Congress responded to the growing insolvency of the
savings and loan (S&L) industry with the passage of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA)
of 1989.' With a third of the S&L industry operating at a loss
and the number of insolvencies expected to grow,2 Congress en-
acted this "emergency legislation"' in an effort "to stop the finan-
cial hemorrhaging."4 Unfortunately for some, Congress was both
in a hurry5 and in a very bad mood.6 The result was a punitive
piece of legislation that has fallen harshly on an often forgotten
group of actors in the S&L drama, the nondepositor creditors of
insolvent financial institutions. These actors include, among others,
the thrifts' employees, trade creditors, landlords, and security hold-
ers.
Congress was not venturing into completely unchartered terri-
tory in sorting out the rights of bank and thrift creditors to the
assets of failed institutions. The Bankruptcy Code7 (the Code)
1. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and
18 U.S.C.).
2. LAWRENCE J. WHrrT, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK
AND THRIFr REGULATION 175 (1991).
3. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Diamond, 18 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting S.
REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989)), cert. denied, 1155 S. Ct. 2609 (1995).
4. Id.
5. See WHrrE, supra note 2, at 176 (noting that losses from insolvent thrifts contin-
ued to mount in the five months it took Congress to enact FIRREA).
6. See id. at 180-81. White states:
In an important sense, the FIRREA was an Act of anger. The Congress ...
[was] angry over the necessity to spend large sums to clean up the problems of
the insolvent thrifts .... The Congress believed it was "bailing out the thrifts,"
rather than being asked to satisfy its obligations on. an insurance arrange-
ment .... This anger ... manifested itself in a number of the provisions of
the FIRREA, with deleterious consequences for all concerned.
Id.
7. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1330 (1994).
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provides a complex framework for resolving the analogous ques-
tion of who is entitled to what when an individual or corporation
becomes insolvent. In fact, it has been said that FIRREA created
a "parallel regime" for financial institutions! While it is true that
FIRREA does resemble the Code, it differs sharply from the
Code in at least one important respect. Whereas the Code aspires
to change the relative rights existing at the date of bankruptcy as
little as possible,9 FIRREA can make no such claim. FIRREA se-
verely curtails the rights of parties who were unlucky enough to
enter into agreements with financial institutions.
The rights of nondepositor creditors are primarily affected by
the joint action of two related provisions of FIRREA. The first is
the extraordinary power of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC) and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) (col-
lectively "the agencies") when acting as receivers and conservators
for failed banks and thrifts" to repudiate any contract to which
an insolvent institution is a party." This power may not seem ex-
traordinary given that contracting parties generally have the option
of breaching their agreements and answering in damages. What
makes this ability extraordinary is that FIRREA also limits the
damages for which the agencies must answer to "actual direct
compensatory damages."' 2 The agencies' repudiation powers, com-
bined with FIRREA's limitation on damages, give them the ability
to breach contracts with virtual impunity in some cases. 3
Part I of this Note examines the ability of the agencies to
repudiate contracts and FIRREA's damage provisions. Part II
compares the remedies available to creditors under FIRREA with
those available under both traditional contract law and the Bank-
ruptcy Code, illustrating the extent to which FIRREA has cur-
tailed creditors' claims. Part III argues that FIRREA's drastic
departure from both contract and bankruptcy laws was an unjust
attempt by Congress to reduce the government's own losses as
8. Unisys Fin. Corp. v. Resoluiion Trust Corp., 979 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1992).
9. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
10. The powers of the FDIC and' the RTC in their capacities as receivers and con-
servators are discussed in detail infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (1994); see infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
12. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3); see infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Howell v. FDIC, 986 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1993) (denying recovery under
repudiated severance agreement); Unisys Fin. Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 979 F.2d
609 (7th Cir. 1992) (denying recovery under repudiated lease agreement).
[Vol. 45:183
FIRREA'S DAMAGE PROVISIONS
insurer of deposit liabilities at the expense of bank and thrift
creditors. 4 Part III also asserts that the limitation of creditors'
claims is no longer necessary in light of the implementation in
1993 of a national depositor preference in receivership proceed-
ings. Depositor preference ensures that the FDIC as subrogee of
depositors' claims will recover in full before contract creditors
receive a dime. 5 Finally, Part IV concludes that-FIRREA's dam-
age limitations have created uncertainty and increased the cost to
creditors of contracting with financial institutions. These increased
costs are then passed on to banks and thrifts. FIRREA's damage
limitations are therefore not only inequitable and unnecessary, but
also costly and should be repealed.
I. THE POWER OF THE RTC AND FDIC TO REPUDIATE
CONTRACTS WITH VIRTUAL IMPUNITY
FIRREA created the RTC to carry out the task of managing
and disposing of the assets of insolvent savings and loan asso-
ciations. 6 In order to fulfill its mission, the RTC was given the
authority to act as conservator or receiver for insured savings
associations.'7 The FDIC possesses comparable authority with
respect to insured banks.'" Congress's aim in appointing the
FDIC or RTC as conservator or receiver is to prevent the further
deterioration in value of a bank's or thrift's assets.' Any delay
14. See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
16. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b) (1994).
17. Id. § 1441a(b)(4)(A). Prior to the enactment of FIRREA, the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) acted as receiver for all closed savings associa-
tions. FEDERAL REGULATION OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS: ENFORCEMENT POWERS
AND PROCEDURES 9.01 (Miles A. Cobb ed., cum. supp. 1991) [hereinafter POWERS
AND PROCEDURES]. The FSLIC was abolished by FIRREA. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 401,
103 Stat. 183, 354-63 (1989).
18. The authority of the FDIC to act as conservator or receiver is found in the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1994). The RTC is a temporary
agency that will cease to exist as an entity as of December 31, 1995, at which time the
FDIC will take over as conservator or receiver of failed savings associations. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(m)(1) (1994). As of March 14, 1995, the RTC had sold the last group of insol-
vent S&L associations under its control, signalling an end to the agency's role in the
S&L crisis. Jack Mazzeo, Thrift Agency Sells Last Group of S&Ls Under Its Control,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1995, at B12.
19. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 232-33.
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in appointing a conservator or receiver increases the ultimate cost
to the FDIC as the insurer of deposits.20
The FDIC or RTC is appointed conservator or receiver in the
event that a depository institution is insolvent,21 is in an "unsafe
or unsound condition to transact business," or "is likely to be
unable to pay its obligations or meet its depositors' demands in
the normal course of business."'  When a receiver is appointed,
the institution's owners lose control of the institution's assets and
their ownership interest in the institution is completely extin-
guished.' The appointment of a conservator is a less drastic mea-
sure, which, while removing control of the assets from the owners,
allows them to retain a claim against the assets that are being
"conserved."'24 As conservators and receivers, the agencies have
the authority to "take over the assets of, operate, and conduct the
business of institutions for which they are appointed, and hold all
powers of the members or shareholders, directors, and officers of
such institutions."'  As receivers, the FDIC and RTC may also li-
quidate the assets of insolvent institutions.26
In addition to entrusting the FDIC and RTC with all of the
powers that the directors, officers, and shareholders once held,
FIRREA provides the agencies with certain extraordinary powers,
including the broad authority to repudiate any contract to which
the bank or thrift is a partyY The FDIC need only determine in
its discretion that the contract is "burdensome" and that repudia-
tion would "promote the orderly administration of the institution's
affairs."'  This power is virtually limitless and is subject only to
20. Id.
21. A depository institution is insolvent when "[t]he institution's assets are less than
the institution's obligations to its creditors and others, including members of the institu-
tion." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5)(A) (1994).
22. Id. § 1821(c)(5)(C), (F).
23. WHrrE, supra note 2, at 232.
24. Id. at 234.
25. POWERS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 17, 1 9.02[3][a]; see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(2)(B)(i) (1994).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(E).
27. See id. § 1821(e)(1)(A).
28. Id. § 1821(e)(1)(B)-(C); see Hennessy v. FDIC, 58 F.3d 908, 920 (3d Cir. 1995)
(noting that "there is no requirement that the conservator or receiver make a formal
finding that a lease or contract is burdensome" and that "whether the lease is burden-
some is to be decided at the discretion of the conservator or receiver" (quoting 1185
Avenue of the Americas Assocs. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 22 F.3d 494, 498 (2d Cir.
1994)); Arthur Leibold, Jr., S&L Regulators Throw Weight Around, TEXAS LAWYER, July
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the minor restriction that repudiation take place within a "reason-
able period" following the appointment of a conservator or
receiver.29
This ability to abrogate contracts takes on special significance
when combined with FIRREA's limitation on the claims resulting
from the repudiation of these contracts. FIRREA limits the agen-
cies' liability to "actual direct compensatory damages" as of the
date of repudiation." "Actual direct compensatory damages" spe-
cifically do not include "punitive or exemplary damages," "damag-
es for lost profits or opportunity," or "damages for pain and suf-
fering."231 With respect to repudiated leases, FIRREA specifically
limits recovery to the amount of rent accrued as of the date of re-
pudiation and provides that no recovery will be had under any ac-
celeration clause or penalty provision.32
FIRREA, however, is noticeably silent on what is included in
"actual direct compensatory damages. 33 The legislative history
surrounding the passage of FIRREA also sheds no light on Con-
gress's purposes or intent in crafting this provision.'4 The D.C.
Circuit ventured a guess at Congress's intent in drafting this re-
strictive damage provision, stating that "Congress appears to us to
have wished to distinguish between those damages which can be
30, 1990, at 22 ("The possible breadth of this discretion is startling. Most non-executory
contracts can be called 'burdensome' if the only remaining act is to pay the person who
has furnished consideration. It is burdensome, after all, to pay bills.").
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1994). Courts have not determined definitively what con-
stitutes a "reasonable period" of time. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cedarminn
Bldg. L.P., 956 F.2d 1446, 1455 (8th Cir.) (stating that "Congress specifically intended to
give RTC flexibility in determining what constitutes a reasonable period for repudiation"),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 94 (1992); Monument Square Assocs. v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
792 F. Supi. 874, 878 (D. Mass. 1991) (stating that reasonable period determined by
looking at "circumstances of each case"); 701 NPB Assoc. v. FDIC, 779 F. Supp. 1336,
1339 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (finding reasonable period to be "fact sensitive"); Rechler Partner-
ship v. Resolution Trust Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18714, at *25 (D.N.J. Sept. 4,
1990) (stating that reasonable is "fact sensitive time").
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (1994).
31. Id. § 1821(e)(3)(B)(i)-(iii).
32. Id. § 1821(e)(4)(B)(i)-(ii).
33. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, "'Compensatory damages' and 'actual
damages' are synonymous terms . . . and include[] all damages other than punitive or
exemplary damages." 25 CJ.S. Damages § 2 (1966). This definition is unenlightening
because the statute specifically excludes both punitive and exemplary damages. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(e)(3)(B)(i).
34. See Howell v. FDIC, 986 F.2d 569, 572 (1st Cir. 1993) ("If there is any illumi-
nating legislative history or precedent, it has not been called to our attention by the
parties and we have been unable to locate anything very helpful.").
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thought to make one whole and those that are designed to go
somewhat further and put a plaintiff securely in a financial posi-
tion he or she would have occupied but for the breach."'35 The
First Circuit was less kind in its assessment, suggesting instead that
the phrase "actual direct compensatory damages" was "plucked
out of the air by Congress., 36 It appears that any further insight
into the meaning of "actual direct compensatory damages" will
have to be gleaned from the decisions of the courts that continue
to apply this provision.
II. A COMPARISON OF THE REMEDIES
AVAILABLE UNDER FIRREA, TRADITIONAL
CONTRACT LAW, AND T=E BANKRUPTCY CODE
The degree to which Congress has pared back claims for dam-
ages can be illustrated by comparing the recoveries of nonde-
positor creditors under FIRREA with the remedies that would
otherwise be available to the same creditors (1) had the financial
institutions with whom they dealt breached their agreements prior
to entering conservatorship or receivership, or (2) had the credi-
tors dealt with insolvent parties other than financial institutions.
These comparisons reveal that FIRREA represents a significant
departure from both traditional contract law and bankruptcy law
that is extremely unfavorable for contract creditors of insolvent
financial institutions.
If a bank or thrift were to breach a contract prior to entering
conservatorship or receivership, that institution, like any other
party to a contract, would be subject to a claim for damages by
the injured party. According to the Restatement Second of Con-
tracts,
Ordinarily, when a court concludes that there has been a breach
of contract, it enforces the broken promise by protecting the ex-
pectation that the injured party had when he made the contract.
It does this by attempting to put him in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed, that is,
had there been no breach. The interest protected in this way is
called the "expectation interest." It is sometimes said to give the
injured party the "benefit of the bargain." 3
35. Office and Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 v. FDIC, 27 F.3d 598,
604 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
36. Howell, 986 F.2d at 572.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a (1981); see also CORBIN
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In protecting a party's "expectation interest," courts may choose
from a wide range of permissible remedies, including awarding
"money due under the contract or as damages" or "requiring
specific performance of a contract or enjoining its non-perfor-
mance."38 A contract may also stipulate in advance what damages
will be payable in the event of breach. 9
In contrast, FIRREA specifically disallows claims for lost
profits and opportunities,' which. are commonly awarded by
courts to protect parties' expectation interests. In order to recover
under FIRREA, a creditor must also demonstrate that the damag-
es sought are "actual."'41 This requirement precludes the recovery
of liquidated damages.42 In addition, FIRREA specifically denies
lessors the benefit of their bargains by disallowing all claims other
than those for back rent.43
Likewise, it appears that nondepositor creditors of financial
institutions fare worse than creditors who have dealt with insolvent
parties other than financial institutions. Because both bankruptcy
law and FIRREA deal with the distribution of assets in the con-
text of insolvency, it would be logical to assume that creditors
would receive similar protections under these "parallel re-
gime[s]."'  However, a comparison of the basic principles underly-
ing these two bodies of law provides the first clue that this as-
sumption is incorrect. Underlying bankruptcy law is the general
principle that, in determining which creditors will receive which as-
sets in bankruptcy, the starting point is nonbankruptcy law: "Bank-
ruptcy law aspires to change rights only as much as is necessary in
ON CONTRACTS Damages § 992 (1964).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 345(a)-(b).
39. Id. § 356(1). Liquidated damages must be "reasonable in the light of the antici-
pated or actual loss. . . . A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unen-
forceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty." Id.
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(B)(ii) (1994).
41. Id. § 1821(e)(3)(A)(i).
42. See, e.g., Howell v. FDIC, 986 F.2d 569, 573 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Severance pay-
ments, stipulated in advance, are at best an estimate of likely harm .... Such payments
comprise or are analogous to 'liquidated damages'.
43. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(4).
44. Unisys Fin. Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 979 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1992).
Courts have referred to bankruptcy by analogy when interpreting FIRREA. See, e.g.,
Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. FDIC, 827 F. Supp. 789, 793 (D.D.C. 1993) ("[T]he
Court finds provisions of bankruptcy law instructive."), mot. for recons granted in part
and denied in part, 857 F. Supp. 976 (D.D.C. 1994).
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order to vindicate bankruptcy policy."'45 No such principle under-
lies FIRREA. FIRREA purposely seeks to limit the claims that
would otherwise be available to nondepositor creditors in the
absence of FIRREA.'
While both the Bankruptcy Code and FIRREA treat rejection
or repudiation as breaches of contracts that give rise to claims for
damages,47 these "parallel regime[s]"48 differ in their treatment
of the claims that arise. In bankruptcy, the measure of damages is
generally determined by reference to applicable nonbankruptcy law
with the exception of special provisions for claims brought by em-
ployees and landlords of debtors.49 In contrast, claims against the
FDIC and RTC are generally limited to "actual direct compensa-
tory damages" with the exception of an even more restrictive pro-
vision dealing with claims arising from the repudiation of leases."
45. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 83 (rev. ed. 1993). The
Supreme Court has stated: "Property interests are created and defined by state law. Un-
less some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding." Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
46. See Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DUKE
LJ. 469, 477-90 (1992) (noting many ways in which bank insolvency law differs from
bankruptcy law).
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1994) ("[R]ejection of an executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease."); Howell v. FDIC, 986
F.2d 569, 571 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that repudiation is treated as breach giving rise to
claim for damages).
48. Unisys Fin. Corp., 979 F.2d at 611.
49. GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 271 (3d
ed. 1993). Provisions concerning leases and employees are located at 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(b)(6), (7).
50. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (1994). The Code also differs from FIRREA in that it
does not grant the bankruptcy trustee the sweeping authority to repudiate any contract
that the trustee finds to be "burdensome." The Code grants a trustee only the limited
power to "reject" executory contracts and unexpired leases. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). An
executory contract is one "under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the
other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other."
Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).
In contrast, the FDIC and the RTC have the authority under FIRREA to repudiate any
contract, leading some commentators to suggest that the agencies may repudiate agree-
ments even when the only performance remaining is the payment of money. See Leibold,
supra note 28, at 22; POWERS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 17, T 9.02[6][a] ("The ques-
tion is whether the FDIC and the RTC can repudiate a contract that has been fully per-
formed. The legislative history of FIRREA is silent on the question, but the statutory Ian-.
guage makes a strong case for repudiation of contracts that have been fully performed as
well as executory contracts."); see also Hennessy v. FDIC, 58 F.3d 908, 919 n.8 (3d Cir.
1995) (dictum) ("As many courts have noted, the statute explicitly provides that a conser-
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The following cases illustrate the courts' application of
FIRREA's damage provisions to claims arising from three types of
contracts: severance agreements, leases, and non-compete agree-
ments. While failing to provide a clear definition of "actual direct
compensatory damages," the cases do reveal that FIRREA's dam-
age provisions are an abrogation of both contract and bankruptcy
law. The cases also provide some clues regarding the extent to
which contract creditors of failed banks and thrifts can expect to
recover.
A. Recovery Under Severance Agreements
"A stranger to FIRREA might think it apparent that breach
of a contract to make severance payments inflicts damages on a
discharged employee in the amount of the promised payments.'
Unfortunately, an analysis of recent decisions leads to the conclu-
sion that recovery for discharged employees is far from certain. At
present, the courts of appeals are split on the issue of whether re-
pudiation by the FDIC or RTC of a severance agreement entered
into between a depository institution and its employees gives rise
to a claim for "actual direct compensatory damages. 52
While acknowledging that its result "[was] a severe one," the
First Circuit held in Howell v. FDIC that the officers of Eliot
Savings Bank could not recover under their severance agreements
with the failed bank.53 The First Circuit viewed the severance
payments as "liquidated damages" that are, by definition, not
"actual damages." 54 The court acknowledged that severance pay-
vator or receiver 'may disaffirm any contract or lease,' not just executory contracts [em-
phasis omitted]."). But see Marsa v. Metrobank for Savings, F.S.B., 825 F. Supp. 658,
665-66 (D.NJ. 1993) (dictum) (concluding that receiver precluded from repudiating non-
executory contracts), affid, 26 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1994).
51. Howell v. FDIC, 986 F.2d 569, 572 (1st Cir. 1993).
52. Compare Howell, 986 F.2d at 569 (disallowing employees' claims for severance
benefits under repudiated severance agreements) and Hennessy, 58 F.3d at 908 (same)
with Office and Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 v. FDIC, 27 F.3d 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (allowing employees to recover severance payments under repudiated collective
bargaining agreement) and Monrad v. FDIC, 62 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1995) (allowing em-
ployees to recover severance payments under repudiated severance agreement).
53. Howell, 986 F.2d at 570. The bank had agreed to pay the four officers an
amount that represented between one and three years of their salaries "in consideration
of the officers' 'willingness to remain' in the bank's employ" despite the bank's unstable
financial condition. Id.
54. ld. at 573; see also Hennessy, 58 F.3d at 921 ("We share the view of the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit that these payments are analogous to 'liquidated damag-
1995]
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ments are often a "good-faith effort" to estimate actual damages
arising from the termination of one's employment, but found that
the "spirit" of the statute does not permit such a construction
given Congress's intention to "strictly ... limit allowable claims
for repudiated contracts., 55
In Hennessy v. FDIC,56 the Third Circuit adopted the First
Circuit's reasoning in Howell, holding that severance payments are
analogous to liquidated damages and therefore not compensable
under FIRREA.57 In addition, the Third Circuit's opinion illus-
trates yet another approach used by some courts in disallowing
claims for severance benefits. The FDIC argued that, before de-
termining whether FIRREA disallows severance payments as an
impermissible form of damages, the court must first determine
whether the plaintiffs have a valid claim for severance pay. 8
es.'"); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Management, Inc., 25 F.3d 627, 632 (8th Cir. 1994)
(citing Howell and stating that clause requiring payment due upon termination of man-
agement company's contract "could be characterized as a liquidated damage clause" and
that "[n]either severance fees nor future lost profits are compensable under FIRREA");
Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Geraghty, 865 F. Supp. 83, 86 (D. Conn. 1994) (dictum)
(citing Howell and stating that damages resulting from the repudiation of a severance
package are not "actual direct compensatory damages" because they are analogous to
liquidated damages). Cf Fresca v. FDIC, 818 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Howell
as authority but finding that medical and life insurance benefits sought by plaintiffs were
not analogous to liquidated damages).
55. Howell, 986 F.2d at 573. The officers also argued that the FDIC, prior to becom-
ing receiver, had encouraged the bank to "take steps to retain its qualified management"
and alleged that the FDIC "knew and approved" of their severance agreements. Id. at
571. The officers argued that, because the FDIC had a hand in forming the severance
agreements, it was estopped from repudiating the agreements. Id. at 574. The court re-
jected these arguments, invoking the "separate capacities" doctrine which treats the FDIC
as "two separate persons" when acting as regulator prior to receivership and when acting
as a receiver. Id.; see also Westport Bank & Trust Co., 865 F. Supp. at 83 (holding that
the FDIC was not estopped from repudiating severance agreement as receiver despite
having consented to the agreement while acting as regulator). The Howell court also
rejected the officers' argument that the application of the "separate-capacities" doctrine
would produce unjust results, stating that the injustice would be no "greater than occurs
in the usual case in which the separate-capacities doctrine is invoked." Howell, 986 F.2d
at 574. The "separate capacities" doctrine has also been used to permit the FDIC and
the RTC, when acting as receivers, to repudiate agreements that they had previously ac-
cepted in their roles as conservators. See, e.g., 1185 Ave. of the Americas Assocs. v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 22 F.3d 494, 498 (2d Cir. 1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Cedarmina Bldg. L.P., 956 F.2d 1446, 1450 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 94 (1992);
Monument Square Assocs. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 792 F. Supp. 874, 878 (D. Mass.
1991).
56. 58 F.3d 908 (3d Cir. 1995).
57. Id. at 921.
58. Id. at 917-19.
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The court stated that "[t]o establish a claim against an insolvent
bank in receivership, the liability of the bank must have accrued
and become unconditionally fixed on or before the time it is de-
clared insolvent .... 'If nothing is due at the time of insolvency,
the claim should not be allowed . . . 2 9 The court concluded
that, because the terms of the plaintiffs' severance agreements
provided that payments were triggered in the event of "lack of
work, job elimination, reorganization, or reduction in work force"
but not explicitly in the event of insolvency, the plaintiffs' rights to
severance payments were "contingent at the time of the appoint-
ment of the receiver."'  Because the plaintiffs were not terminat-
ed prior to the appointment of the receiver, they did not have a
claim for damages.61
59. Id. at 918 (quoting Kennedy v. Boston-Continental Nat'l Bank, 84 F.2d 592, 597
(1st Cir. 1936)); see also Westport Bank & Trust Co., 865 F. Supp. at 86 (dictum) ("As
of the date of [the bank's] insolvency, the claimants' benefits under their employment
agreements had not become vested in that the payment of the trust funds were contin-
gent upon prior termination of their employment.").
60. Hennessy, 58 F.3d at 913, 918.
61. Courts have also disallowed claims for severance pay under 12 C.F.R_ § 563.39,
which provides guidelines for federally insured savings associations (but not banks) to
follow when entering into employment contracts with officers and employees. See, e.g.,
Modzelewski v. Resolution Trust Corp., 14 F.3d 1374, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1994); Fleischer
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 882 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (D. Kan. 1995); Romines v. Great-
West Life Assur. Co., 865 F. Supp. 607, 610 (E.D. Mo. 1994); Rush v. FDIC, 747 F.
Supp. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 12 C.F.R. § 563.39(b)(4) (1995) provides: "If the sav-
ings association is in default . . . all obligations under the [employment] contract shall
terminate as of the date of default, but this paragraph (b)(4) shall not affect any vested
rights of the contracting parties .... " The Ninth Circuit has held that benefits are
"vested when the employee holding the right is entitled to claim immediate payment."
Modzelewski, 14 F.3d at 1378. Therefore, if "termination without cause is a condition
precedent to the vesting of an employee's rights, no vesting occurs when his or her
contract is extinguished by operation of law pursuant to § 563.39(b)[(4)]." Romines, 865
F. Supp. at 610 (citing Crocker v. Resolution Trust Corp., 747 F. Supp. 575, 578-79
(N.D. Cal. 1990)).
Although the Ninth Circuit has held that claims for severance benefits under agree-
ments terminated pursuant to § 563.39 are not vested, and therefore not compensable,
unless an employee is terminated prior to the appointment of a receiver, it has taken a
contrary position with respect to claims that arise from the repudiation of severance plans
not subject to termination under § 563.39. Compare Modzelewski, 14 F.3d at 1379-80
with Monrad v. FDIC, 62 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 1995). In Monrad, the Ninth Circuit
stated, "[T]he fact that actual termination post-dates the appointment of the receiver is
insufficient to defeat an otherwise valid claim for severance pay." 62 F.3d at 1174. Al-
though the Ninth Circuit did not attempt to reconcile these two opinions, it is possible to
distinguish Modzelewski as an exercise of the Ninth Circuit's authority to interpret an
undefined term ("vested") in a federal statute. In contrast, the determination of whether
rights are sufficiently vested or accrued in the absence of a statute is a question of con-
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This result is startling given that many troubled banks and
thrifts offered their managers severance agreements as compensa-
tion for their continued employment at a time when the futures of
the institutions employing them were highly uncertain.62 The pur-
pose of the agreements was to protect against the possibility that
the banks' financial conditions would deteriorate further and that
management would be unemployed in the near future. Ironically,
the event from which employees sought to protect themselves-in-
solvency-was the event that made their severance agreements
worthless.
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit has wisely rejected the arguments
of the First and Third Circuits. In Office and Professional Employ-
ees International Union, Local 2 v. FDIC,63 the D.C. Circuit held
that the employees of the National Bank of Washington were
entitled to severance payments under a collective bargaining agree-
ment that the FDIC as receiver repudiated.64 The court first re-
jected the argument that severance benefits are not recoverable
unless the right to receive them has "vested" at the date of receiv-
ership.6' Judge Silberman persuasively argued,
tract law to be determined with reference to applicable state law. See Nashville Lodging
Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 59 F.3d 236, 244-45 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying Tennessee
law in determining whether claim for damages under repudiated contract had "accrued").
Therefore, a claim that would be found to be unvested if judged under the stringent test
fashioned by the Ninth Circuit for claims arising under § 563.39 may nevertheless be
sufficiently vested under applicable contract laws so as to be compensable.
62. See, e.g., Hennessy, 58 F.3d at 914 (Management received letters stating that the
bank "is acutely aware that [it] is essential to retain motivated employees such as you in
key positions. As evidence of this awareness, [the bank] is extending . . . the Separation
Pay Program to a total of 52 weeks pay."); Howell v. FDIC, 986 F.2d 569, 570 (1st Cir.
1993) (noting that severance agreements were made "in consideration of the officers'
'willingness to remain' in the bank's employ" despite the bank's unstable financial condi-
tion).
63. 27 F.3d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
64. Id. at 601. The Ninth Circuit has also rejected the reasoning of the First and
Third Circuits, stating that Office and Professional Employees "offers the better-reasoned
approach. FDIC's liability for 'actual direct compensatory damages' . . . includes sever-
ance pay." Monrad v. FDIC, 62 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 1995).
65. Office and Professional Employees, 27 F.3d at 601-02; see also Monrad, 62 F.3d
at 1174; Soriero v. FDIC, 887 F. Supp. 103, 108 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Citibank (South Dako-
ta), N.A. v. FDIC, 827 F. Supp. 789, 791 (D.D.C. 1993) (The court rejected the FDIC's
argument that the plaintiff's claim should be disallowed because it was contingent:
"[C]laims are always contingent on the date of insolvency because a receiver cannot
repudiate a contract until after it is appointed."), mot. for recons granted in part and
denied in part, 857 F. Supp. 976 (D.D.C. 1994). Cf. Nashville Lodging Co., 59 F.3d at
244 ("The idea that an obligation must have become absolute by the time of insolvency
had clearly weakened even before FIRREA's adoption, however, and it plainly has not
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The employees had the right to severance pay as of the date of
appointment-albeit a contingent one .... That severance pay-
ments are not paid unless and until an employee is terminated
(laid off) for economic reasons, while significant for determining
the value of the payments at any given time, does not mean that
the right to such severance is worthless until the date of termina-
tion.66
This court, unlike the Third Circuit, recognized that the severance
agreements were meant to be part of the "employee's compensa-
tion package." 67 Judge Silberman stated that "it can hardly be
suggested that this sort of protection lacks any immediate val-
ue-particularly after the last few years of 'downsizing' in the
American labor market."6s
The court found that the closest analogy to severance pay-
ments is a bank's issuance of a standby letter of credit requiring
the bank to pay the holder in the event that a third party de-
faults.69 Such claims are valid "even though the bank's obligation
to pay is still contingent as of the date of insolvency."7 Judge
Silberman saw "no reason why the result should be different for
severance payments where the termination is not effected until af-
ter the appointment of the receiver."'"
The court also disagreed with the First Circuit's labeling in
Howell of severance payments as "liquidated . .. damages."'72 The
D.C. Circuit stated that the First Circuit "overlooked, in our opin-
ion, the point that an employer's promise to make severance pay-
survived the statute's specification of claims recoverable upon repudiation in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(e)(3).").
66. Office and Professional Employees, 27 F.3d at 601.
67. Id.
68. 1d at 602; see also LaMagna v. FDIC, 828 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1993) ("To
have any meaning, a promise for severance benefits must vest at the moment the parties
finalize their agreement. The very purpose of the severance provision was to protect
LaMagna from the type of events which transpired ....").
69. Office and Professional Employees, 27 F.3d at 602.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 603. The D.C. Circuit held that the FDIC's reliance on certain ERISA
cases, which held that severance benefits are not "vested," was misplaced. Id. at 602. The
court stated that those cases do not address "whether a promise to make severance pay-
ments may be binding and enforceable under contract law." Id.
72. Id. at 603. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text for a description of the
First Circuit's arguments in Howell v. FDIC, 986 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1993).
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ments is part of the consideration of the employment contract.0 3
Judge Silberman also pointed out that the employees in Howell
had an "at will" relationship with the bank.74 Because the bank
was free to terminate the employees "at will" without subjecting
itself to a claim for damages, the severance payments could not
have been intended as "liquidated damages."'75
Congress's enactment in 1990 of specific provisions disallowing
"golden parachute" payments76 provides further support for the
D.C. Circuit's holding that FIRREA does not mandate the disal-
lowance of claims for severance pay.' As David R. Levinson, the
attorney for the plaintiffs in Office and Professional Employees,78
argued, "[I]f [FIRREA] really excluded severance pay... Con-
gress was wasting its time in enacting ... the golden parachute
provision., 79 The First and Third Circuits' holdings also appear
contrary to the regulations proposed by the FDIC to implement
the "golden parachute" provisions" that specifically permit the
FDIC to make payments to employees under "nondiscriminatory
severance pay plan[s]"'" and to individuals hired for the specific
purpose of "saving" institutions.'I The FDIC, however, has under-
73. Office and Professional Employees, 27 F.3d at 603.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(k) (1994). Section 1828(k)(4)(A) defines a "golden para-
chute payment" as
any payment (or any agreement to make any payment) in the nature of com-
pensation by any insured depository institution ... for the benefit of any insti-
tution-affiliated party pursuant to an obligation of such institution ... that-(i)
is contingent on the termination of such party's affiliation with the institu-
tion ... ; and (ii) is received on or after the date on which-(I) the insured
depository institution ... is insolvent; (II) any conservator or receiver is ap-
pointed for such institution; [or] (III) the institution's appropriate Federal bank-
ing agency determines that the insured depository institution is in a troubled
condition ....
A payment is also a "golden parachute payment" if the payment was made in contempla-
tion of any of the events listed in § 1828(k)(4). Id. § 1828(k)(4)(B).
77. Id. § 1828(k).
78. 27 F.3d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
79. See Severance Pay Sanctioned, Panel Limits FDIC Power to Reject Union Pacts,
THE BANKING ATrORNEY, July 25, 1994, at 1, 2.
80. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,069 (1995) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 359). The FDIC pro-
posed a previous set of regulations implementing § 1828(k) in 1991. See 56 Fed. Reg.
50,529 (1991). The FDIC decided to issue a second set of regulations to address the
comments received during the public comment period. See 60 Fed. Reg. 16,069, 16,069
(1995).
81. See 60 Fed. Reg. 16,069,, 16,079 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 359.1(f)(2)(v)).
82. See id. at 16,081 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 359.4(a)(2)).
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standably chosen not to view the favorable court decisions such as
those in Howell83 and Hennessy84 as contrary to its regulations.
A footnote to the supplementary information preceding the pro-
posed regulations states that "[c]laims for certain benefits may not
be provable or constitute 'actual direct compensatory damages' ...
if the institution is placed in receivership. This regulation does not
provide otherwise."'  Nevertheless, the FDIC's interpretation is
tenuous given that the "golden parachute" provisions provide
strong support for the view that Congress, when it passed the
"golden parachute" provisions in 1990, did not believe that FIR-
REA had limited claims for severance pay.
Little can be said in conclusion about the recovery available
under repudiated severance agreements other than that recovery is
very uncertain. With five courts of appeals having addressed the
issue, a consensus has yet to be reached as to whether claims
under repudiated severance agreements constitute "actual direct
compensatory damages." This lack of uniformity is not surprising
given the inherent ambiguity of the phrase "actual direct compen-
satory damages." While the D.C. Circuit's arguments in favor of
allowing claims for severance pay are both persuasive and more
easily reconciled with Congress's specific disallowance of only
certain types of severance agreements, the D.C. Circuit, joined by
the Ninth Circuit, is currently in the minority on this issue. In the
absence of clear guidelines, three circuits' and several district
courts' have chosen to give effect to what can be viewed as a
general intention by Congress to limit creditors' claims. Unfortu-
nately for the employees of failed banks and thrifts, Congress did
not make clear exactly how far it intended to go in paring back
creditors' claims.89
83. 986 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1993).
84. 58 F.3d 908 (3d Cir. 1995).
85. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,069, 16,077 n.13 (1995).
86. See discussion supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
87. See Hennessy v. FDIC, 58 F.3d 908 (3d Cir. 1995); Howell v. FDIC, 986 F.2d
569 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Management, Inc., 25 F.3d 627
(8th Cir. 1994) (deciding analogous issue of whether a severance fee owed to a manage-
ment firm is compensable under FIRREA).
88. See, e.g., Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Geraghty, 865 F. Supp. 83 (D. Conn.
1994); Fresca v. FDIC, 818 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (dictum); Rush v. FDIC, 747 F.
Supp. 575 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
89. The Third Circuit recognized this ambiguity:
[W]e must contend with competing policy considerations. On the one hand, we
have the concern raised in Howell that in drafting FIRREA, "Congress, faced
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The First and Third Circuits' total disallowance of severance
payments appears especially harsh in comparison to the remedies
that would otherwise be available to the discharged employees
under either contract or bankruptcy law. If a bank were to breach
a severance agreement with its employees prior to entering conser-
vatorship or receivership, the employees would clearly be entitled
to the amounts owed them under the contract. Even in bankruptcy
proceedings, employees have a claim for the amount to which they
were entitled under their employment contracts for a period of
one year.9"
This one-year limitation under bankruptcy law is justified as a
means of curbing abuse by "insiders"'" and is similar in purpose
to the "golden parachute" provisions applicable to insured financial
institutions. The need to protect creditors in bankruptcy from cer-
tain transactions that are highly susceptible to abuse by "insiders"
with mountainous bank failures," was "determined to pare back damage claims
founded on repudiated contracts .... " On the other hand, we must address
the point raised in [Office and Professional Employees] that the question is not
whether Congress meant to scale back damage claims, but "which damage
claims, however few, are preserved."
Hennessy, 58 F.3d at 921.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7) (1994). In addition, the first $4,000 of an employee's
claim for any wages and severance benefits earned within the 90 days prior to the filing
of the bankruptcy petition enjoy a priority over virtually all other claims. Id. § 507(a).
The treatment of collective bargaining agreements under bankruptcy law is some-
what more complicated. "Rejecting a collective bargaining agreement in bankruptcy has
the effect of forcing the union to negotiate a new deal." BAIRD, supra note 45, at 127.
Procedures for bargaining are provided for in section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
at 130. This is the proper treatment because, outside of bankruptcy, a firm cannot escape
its collective bargaining agreements. Id. It must "go back to the union and cut a new
deal." ld. Similar treatment inside and outside of bankruptcy is needed to prevent parties
from filing for bankruptcy in order to avoid their collective bargaining agreements. See
id. Section 1114 of the Code "requires the firm to keep paying retirees their medical
benefits in the absence of renegotiations, and treats these obligations as administrative
expenses." Id at 129. However, "[o]bligations under a collective bargaining agreement
disappear when a firm liquidates." Id. at 128. According to Baird, "To solve the problem
that retirees face when their firms fail, one cannot rely completely on bankruptcy law.
One must make sure that there are sufficient assets to cover the obligations and that
firms are forced to meet these obligations whether they are in bankruptcy or not." Id.
91. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 94. Baird explains:
Those employees most likely to be affected by the breach of long-term employ-
ment contracts are employees with golden parachutes and they frequently are
insider-shareholders. When these contracts are unusually favorable, there may be
a significant chance of self-dealing that violates the rights of creditors as a
group. The cap ... may be a means of policing misbehavior that is hard to
identify.
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explains why the Bankruptcy Code provides for a more limited
remedy in this context than does traditional contract law.' How-
ever, a similar explanation does not exist to justify the disparity
between the Code's allowance of up to one year's severance pay
and the view of the majority of courts that FIRREA totally disal-
lows virtually all severance benefits. Not only does FIRREA deny
employees the financial protections for which they have bargained,
but it does so to an extent that is inconsistent with contract and
bankruptcy laws.
B. Recovery Under Lease Agreements
Unlike claims under severance agreements, claims resulting
from the repudiation of lease agreements are not subject- to
FIRREA's ambiguous "actual direct compensatory damages" limi-
tation. FIRREA contains relatively straightforward provisions deal-
ing specifically with damages arising from the repudiation of leas-
es.93 The statute provides that recovery is limited to the amount
of rent accrued as of the date of repudiation and that no recovery
will be had under any acceleration clause or penalty provision.94
Unfortunately for those who leased property to financial institu-
tions, Congress made perfectly clear that lessors are entitled to
absolutely nothing in most cases.95
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Unisys Finance Corporation
v. Resolution Trust Corp.96 is illustrative of the manner in which
courts have applied FIRREA's lease repudiation provisions.'
92. See id.
93. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(4) (1994) ("(A) If the conservator or receiver disaffirms
or repudiates a lease under which the insured depository institution was the lessee, the
conservator or receiver shall not be liable for any damages . . . for the disaffirmance or
repudiation of such lease. (B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the lessor . . . shall -
(i) be entitled to the contractual rent accruing . . . (ii) have no claim for damages under
any acceleration clause or other penalty provision in the lease; and (iii) have a claim for
any unpaid rent .
94. 1l
95. See id. Realizing that FIRREA is explicit in precluding recovery, lessors unwilling
to admit defeat often resort to claims that repudiations were ineffective due to the
agencies' failure to observe certain formalities, such as FIRREA's requirement that repu-
diation take place within a "reasonable period" of time. See, e.g., cases cited supra note
29 and accompanying text. For the most part, lessors have also been unsuccessful in
challenging repudiation on this ground. Id.
96. 979 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1992).
97. See also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ford- Motor Corp., 30 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir.
1994), a case involving the repudiation of a lease of computer equipment from Burroughs
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Concordia Federal Bank leased computer equipment from Unisys
pledging securities as collateral for its lease obligation.98
Concordia later became insolvent and the RTC as receiver repudi-
ated the lease.9 The court disallowed Unisys' claim, stating that
FIRREA was "explicit in cutting off the lessor's right to obtain
damages" resulting from the repudiation of a lease.'
Unisys argued that, despite FIRREA's general disallowance of
damages in section 1821(e)(4), it was entitled to satisfy its claim
from the securities in which it held a security interest." 1 Unisys
attempted to rely on section 1821(e)(11), which states that "[n]o
provision of this subsection ... shall be construed as permitting
the avoidance of any legally enforceable or perfected security in-
terest.' '1 2 The court stated, "That claim is dead by operation of
the statute, and when [the claim] died the securities pledged to its
satisfaction became the unencumbered assets of the receivered sav-
ings bank."' 3 This case makes it clear that those who have leas-
ed property to failed depository institutions are not protected by
security interests in the institutions' assets. The initial and disposi-
tive inquiry is whether the lessor has a valid claim under FIR-
REA; typically, the answer is no. As the court explained, "If the
claim disappears-poof! the lien is gone."'"
FIRREA's complete extinguishment of all claims other than
those for back rent undoubtedly comes as an unpleasant surprise
to lessors who, having received security interests in institutions'
assets, felt confident that their contract rights would be protected.
In fact, had these lessors been dealing with anyone other than in-
solvent depository institutions, their rights would have been pro-
tected. Undertraditional contract law, if a bank were to breach its
lease agreement prior to entering receivership, it would most likely
be liable for damages to its lessor in an amount equal to the dif-
ference between the value of the rental payments remaining and
the market rental rate at the time of the breach. 5 Alternatively,
Financing Corp., the predecessor of Unisys Financial Corp.
98. Unisys Fin. Corp., 979 F.2d at 610.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id
102. I
103. Id at 610-11.
104. Id at 611.
105. See AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 17 (1995) ("The measure of damages
recoverable for the lessee's breach is the excess, if any, of the agreed rental over the ac-
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the lessor would be entitled to the amount of liquidated damages
stipulated in the lease agreement.'06
Likewise, the rights of lessors who have contracted with insol-
vent parties other than financial institutions are protected by the
Bankruptcy Code. As in the case of employment contracts, the
Code does limit the amount of damages resulting from breach of
an agreement to lease real property.1°7 Damages are first deter-
mined with reference to nonbankruptcy law °8 and are then limit-
ed to one year's rent under the agreement. 19 If more than six
and two-thirds years remain under the lease, the claim is limited
to rent for 15% of the remaining term of the lease, not to exceed
three years rent.10 It is important to note, however, that these
limits apply only to the lease of real property, whereas FIRREA
disallows claims for damages resulting from the repudiation of
both real and personal property."' For example, because Unisys
leased personal property, it would have had a claim for the full
amount of damages allowable under traditional contract law had it
dealt with an insolvent party other than a financial institution. As
was true in the case of bank and thrift employees, a great and
seemingly inequitable disparity exists between the treatment of les-
sors under FIRREA and the treatment of lessors under contract
and bankruptcy laws.
C. Recovery For Violation of an Agreement not to Compete
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia had its
task cut out for it when it addressed in Citibank (South Dakota),
tual rental value of the premises .
106. See kL § 18 ("Provisions for liquidated damages in agreements or contracts for a
lease are generally enforceable."); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 356 cmt. a ("The parties to a contract may effectively provide in advance the damages
that are payable in the event of breach so long as the provision does not disregard the
principle of compensation.").
107. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (1994).
108. TREISTER ET AL., supra note 49, at 239.
109. lad; 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6). Unlike the case of employment contracts, it is not
clear what justification underlies this cap on damages. See BAIRD, supra note 45, at 93
("The usual justification for capping a landlord's damages is that they are hard to mea-
sure, but this justification is not sound.").
110. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6).
111. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1389 (11th
Cir. 1994) ("The damage provisions for repudiated leases in Section 1821(e)(4) give no
indication that they do not apply equally to all types of leases.").
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N.A. v. FDIC the question of whether the FDIC's repudiation of a
non-compete agreement gives rise to a claim for "actual direct
compensatory damages.""12 Not only was the court faced with
the difficult task of placing a monetary value on an injury for
which courts have traditionally agreed that money is an inadequate
remedy,"3 but it was required to do so within the framework of
FIRREA's restrictive damage provisions." 4 This district court is
the only court that has grappled with this unique issue.
Citibank sought to recover damages resulting from the FDIC's
repudiation of an agreement not to compete entered into between
Citibank and Bank of New England, N.A., The Connecticut Bank
and Trust Company, N.A., and Maine National Bank ("BNE
Banks")."5 Citibank had purchased the credit card businesses of
the BNE Banks along with an agreement by the BNE Banks not
to solicit former credit card customers for a period of four
years."6 The FDIC, as receiver, subsequently sold the assets of
the BNE Banks to Fleet/Norstar Financial Corporation unencum-
bered by the non-compete provision and formally repudiated the
agreement with Citibank."7 Fleet then proceeded to compete
with Citibank for its credit card business."18
On the FDIC's motion for reconsideration, the district court
held that Citibank could recover only if it could show that it had
suffered "actual damages" as a result of the repudiation."9 In
112. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. FDIC, 827 F. Supp. 789 (D.D.C. 1993) (quoting
12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988)), motion for recons. granted in part and denied in part, 857 F.
Supp. 976 (D.D.C. 1994).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 intro, note (1981) ("Courts
have been increasingly willing to order performance in a wide variety of cases involv-
ing . ... covenants not to compete."); see also Citibank, 827 F. Supp. at 793 ("No
FIRREA case has addressed whether banking law considers non-compete provisions to be
valuable assets.").
114. See Citibank, 827 F. Supp. at 792 ("To succeed, Citibank's claim must overcome
the damage limitations codified in § 1821(e)(3)(B), which allow only 'actual direct com-
pensatory damages' . . . . Defendants concede that Citibank's claim is compensatory.
However, defendants claim that Citibank's damages are not 'actual direct compensatory
damages,' but rather are damages for lost profit or opportunity.").
115. Citibank (South Dakota) v. FDIC, 857 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D.D.C. 1994). The dis-
trict court issued two opinions-one which memorialized the court's bench opinion and
another on motion for reconsideration. The court changed its holding only with regard to
the appropriate measure of damages.
116. Id-
117. Id. at 979.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 982-83.
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determining whether the repudiation gave rise to actual damages,
the court held that it would be dispositive whether the BNE
Banks' assets were transferred to Fleet as a "going concern."' 2"
The court noted that, unless the FDIC transferred an entity to
Fleet that was capable of competing with Citibank, "actual damag-
es" would be zero.' If, however, the BNE Banks' assets were
transferred as a "going concern," the appropriate measure of dam-
ages would be "coextensive with the increased competitive capacity
of Fleet attributable to the FDIC's transfer of the BNE Bank as-
sets and liabilities without the encumbrance of the non-compete
provision."'" The court elaborated on this measure of damages,
stating that "[t]he increased competitive capacity of Fleet is not to
be confused with any increased competitive activity by Fleet.""
The court further stated that "[ilt is irrelevant whether Fleet ac-
tually has used or will use the assets and liabilities it has assumed
in competition with Citibank." 24
This measure of damages is not the same as the method ap-
proved by the court in its first opinion, which memorialized the
court's bench opinion. The court had originally assented to Citi-
bank's calculation of damages as "the present value of the amount
it paid for the non-compete provision which the FDIC later repu-
diated."'" The court had stated, "As in the case of any intangi-
ble asset, appraisal may involve calculating the difference in value
between the performance promised and the performance re-
ceived."'26 Although this calculation is far from simplistic, it is
manageable. The present value of a known purchase price is far
more easily determined than an amount "coextensive with the in-
creased competitive capacity attributable to the FDIC's transfer of
the BNE assets and liabilities without the encumbrance of the
non-compete provision."'27 In throwing yet another factor into
the equation-namely the possibility that the assets transferred
were not "the entities whose non-competition Citibank sought to
120. Id. at 983.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 983 n.8.
124. Id.
125. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. FDIC, 827 F. Supp. 789, 793 (D.D.C. 1993),
motion for recons. granted in part and denied in part, 857 F. Supp. 976 (D.D.C. 1994).
126. Id.
127. Citibank, 857 F. Supp. at 983.
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ensure"'--the court greatly increased the complexity of the
damage calculation. Just how much Citibank will eventually recov-
er of the $44 million in damages it sought, however, remains un-
clear. What is clear is that tailoring a remedy to comply with
FIRREA's requirement that damages be "actual" is not an easy
task.
Even when not faced with a complicating factor such as
FIRREA's damage limitations, courts have traditionally viewed
monetary damages as an inadequate remedy for violation of a
non-compete agreement.129 A plaintiff is normally entitled to eq-
uitable relief such as an injunction requiring the other party to
comply with the agreement.' Because of the inherent difficulty
in placing a monetary value on the claims that are ordinarily en-
forceable in a court of equity, several courts have held that con-
tracts such as non-compete agreements are not subject to rejection
in bankruptcy.' Because debtors cannot reject these claims, the
agreements are enforceable and the other party to the agreement
may seek equitable relief-namely an injunction to prevent the
debtor from engaging in competition.
Some courts have, however, permitted rejection of non-com-
pete agreements in bankruptcy, but only when these agreements
are a part of a larger executory contract such as a franchise agree-
ment on the theory that a debtor must assume or reject a contract
in its entirety.132 Courts following this approach have awarded
128. Id at 984.
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACrS § 357 intro, note (1981) ("Courts have
been increasingly willing to order performance in a wide variety of cases involving ...
covenants not to compete.").
130.. See id. ("[Ain injunction against breach of a contract duty will be granted ...if
(a) the duty is one of forbearance . .. ."). Section 357, illus. 2, gives the breach of a
non-compete agreement as an example of a situation in which an injunction is an appro-
priate remedy. ld.
131. See, e.g., Fellerman & Cohen Realty Corp. v. Clinical Plus, Inc. (In re
Hirschhorn), 156 B.R. 379, 388 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("non-compete clause emerges
unscathed following the rejection of the lease"); In re Docktor Pet Ctrs., Inc., 1992
Bankr. LEXIS 1151, at *15 (Bankr. D. Mass July 22, 1992) ("[T]he non-competition
clauses contained in the 'wind-down' provisions of the franchisee agreements continue to
be enforceable."), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Rails v. Docktor Pet Ctrs.,
Inc., 177 B.R. 420 (D. Mass. 1995); see also Carstens Health Indus. v. Cooper (In re
Cooper), 47 B.R. 842 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that restrictive covenant in em-
ployment agreement that prevented solicitation of former clients or employees could not
be rejected).
132. See, e.g., Silk Plants, Etc. Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Register (In re Register), 95
B.R. 73, 74-75 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn), affd, 100 B.R. 360, 362 (M.D. Tenn. 1989); Burger
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creditors a monetary claim for any damages resulting from the
rejection of the agreement." Some courts following this ap-
proach have nevertheless held that non-compete agreements can-
not be rejected if they are part of the nonexecutory portion of a
larger agreement, thereby limiting the number of cases in which it
is necessary to determine monetary damages." The remedies
available under contract law and bankruptcy law are therefore
often the same-equitable relief.
A bankruptcy court, applying either of the approaches dis-
cussed above135 to the facts of Citibank'36 would not permit the
debtor to reject the non-compete agreement. Under either tradi-
tional contract or bankruptcy law, Citibank would have been enti-
tled to equitable relief, specifically an injunction preventing the
FDIC from transferring the BNE Bank assets unencumbered by
the non-compete provisions. 37 This is the only remedy that can
truly be viewed as making Citibank whole. In contrast, under FIR-
REA, Citibank is limited to monetary damages and can recover
only if it can meet the difficult challenge of proving that it has
suffered "actual" damage from the repudiation of the agree-
ment. Once again, the remedies available under FIRREA fall
far short of those available under either contract or bankruptcy
laws.
King Corp. v. Rovine Corp. (In re Rovine Corp.), 6 B.R. 661, 666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1980).
133. Silk Plants, 95 B.R. at 74-75; Burger King, 6 B.R. at 666-67.
134. For example, assume that a debtor sold a business along with an agreement not
to compete and an executory promise to aid the purchaser in selling any slow-moving in-
ventory. The court would view the agreement not to compete as part of the
nonexecutory contract to sell the business rather than part of the ancillary agreement to
help sell the inventory and not allow rejection of the agreement not to compete. See In
re Cutters, Inc., 104 B.R. 886, 890 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989) (distinguishing In re Regis-
ter, 95 B.R. at 74-75). For a thorough discussion of the rejection of covenants not to
compete in bankruptcy, see Jonathan H. Moss, Has Bankruptcy Forgotten the Restrictive
Covenant? A Disturbing Trend for Franchise Systems, 10 BANKR. DEv. J. 237 (1994).
135. The agreement not to compete in Citibank was not part of a larger executory
contract.
136. 857 F. Supp. 976 (D.D.C. 1994).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 129-131.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 119-124.
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III. AN EXPLANATION FOR CONGRESS'S LIMITATION
OF CONTRACT CREDITORS' CLAIMS
The sharp contrast between the rights of creditors under
FIRREA and the rights of creditors under both traditional con-
tract law and bankruptcy law makes one wonder what could possi-
bly justify the difference. Are FIRREA's limitations on contract
claims necessary to protect depositors of failed banks and thrifts?
The answer is no. The FDIC insures deposits up to $100,000,
regardless of whether there are sufficient assets to satisfy the
claims of both creditors and depositors.'39 Even uninsured depos-
its, those above $100,000, are fully protected in over half of all
bank failures." On the contrary, FIRREA's limitations on con-
tract claims are an attempt by Congress to maximize the recovery
of the single largest creditor of insolvent banks and thrifts-the
United States government.
A. FIRREA's Pre-1993 Distribution Scheme Provided an Incentive
for Congress to Limit Contract Creditors' Claims
An examination of the scheme by which the assets of failed
financial institutions were distributed under FIRREA prior to 1993
reveals that the government stood to gain a great deal by reducing
contract creditors' claims. As originally passed in 1989, FIRREA
provided for the pro rata distribution of the assets of insolvent
institutions.' General creditors and depositors shared in the dis-
tribution of receivership assets on a pro rata basis according to the
value of their claims. 4' When a bank fails, the FDIC, as the in-
surer of the bank and thrift deposits, pays depositors and acts as a
subrogee to their claims. 43 In the event the liabilities of a failed
139. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
140. John L. Douglas, Depositor Preference May Harm Banks, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23,
1993, at 18. Even in cases in which uninsured deposits are not fully covered, the FDIC
provides "uninsured depositors with immediate access to a significant portion of their
funds." Id. (citation omitted); see 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d)(4).
141. 12 U.S.C. § 1S21(d)(11)(A) ("The receiver shall . . . (ii) pay to depositors and
other creditors the net amounts available for distribution to them.").
142. See id.
143. Id. ("The receiver shall-(i) retain for the account of the [FDIC] such portion of
the amounts realized from any liquidation as the [FDICI may be entitled to receive in
connection with the subrogation of the claims of depositors .... ").
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bank or thrift exceeded its assets, all creditors, including the FDIC,
would "suffer some of the pain of the failure."'"
The advantage to the FDIC from limiting the claims of non-
depositor creditors then becomes clear. As the First Circuit ac-
knowledged,
[T]he legislators knew that ... the government's own liability (to
insured depositors) would be effectively increased to the extent
th at remaining assets went to contract-claim creditors of the bank
rather than to the government (as the subrogee for the insured
depositors whom the FDIC compensated directly). It is thus not
surprising that Congress might wish to disallow certain damage
claims deemed less worthy than other claims.45
In addition to reducing the number of general creditors with
whom the FDIC would share proportionately, FIRREA's damage
provisions also limited or reduced the claims of some secured
creditors whose claims would have had priority over those of gen-
eral creditors such as the FDIC.' 6
It is less clear how Congress determined some claims to be
less worthy. As discussed previously, the means by which Congress
chose to limit claims is an abrogation of both traditional contract
and bankruptcy laws. 47 Some commentators have gone so far as
to suggest that "many legislators and congressional staffers proba-
bly did not understand FIRREA's potential impact on S&L credi-
tors. Considering how many legislators are lawyers, it would be
strange and unexpected if they knowingly had structured a system
that ... accords creditors such [meager] rights and that contrasts
so sharply with the federal bankruptcy laws."'" In its haste to
secure as large a recovery as possible for the government, Con-
gress forgot that it is also the "purpose of insolvency statutes to
preserve the rights existing at the time of insolvency."'49
144. Douglas, supra note 140, at 22.
145. Howell v. FDIC, 986 F.2d 569, 572 (1st Cir. 1993).
146. FIRREA, as enacted in 1989, states: "No provision of this subsection shall be
construed as permitting the avoidance of any legally enforceable or perfected security
interest . . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(11) (1994).
147. See discussion supra Part II.
148. Leibold, supra note 28, at 22. Arthur Leibold, Jr. is the former general counsel
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp.,
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. Ld.
149. See Office and Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 v. FDIC, 27 F.3d
598, 604-05 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting FDIC v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 806 F.2d 961, 965
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B. The 1993 Depositor Preference Provisions Make Limitations
on Creditors' Claims Unnecessary
Although the government's desire to secure a larger recovery
for itself is arguably an unjustified basis for curtailing creditors'
rights, it does explain FIRREA's harsh treatment of creditors'
claims. FIRREA's damage limitations may be inequitable and
difficult for courts to apply, but they did serve Congress's goal of
maximizing the FDIC's recovery. A 1993 amendment to the Feder-
al Deposit Insurance Act establishing a national depositor prefer-
ence for federal depository institutions has made it unnecessary for
the FDIC to limit creditors' claims. The amendment replaced FIR-
REA's pro rata distribution scheme with a scheme that places the
FDIC alone at the head of the line to receive bank assets."'
The depositor-preference provisions provide for .the payment
of claims in accordance with a list of priorities.' 5' All deposit lia-
bilities must be paid before the general creditors of a financial
institution receive anything. 2 As mentioned previously, the
FDIC, as insurer of deposit liability, pays depositors' claims re-
gardless of whether the assets of the institution are sufficient to
cover its liabilities. 53 The FDIC is then subrogated to these
claims and stands in the shoes of the depositors in this priority
scheme."5 As John L. Douglas, former counsel to the FDIC
pointed out, "Depositor preference has little to do with whether
depositors are paid when a bank fails .... A more apt descrip-
tion might be 'FDIC preference."" 55
(10th Cir. 1986)).
150. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 3001, 107
Stat. 312, 336 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11)(A) (1994)). In 1993, almost half of the
states already had depositor-preference provisions in place. Douglas, supra note 140, at
18. This number had greatly increased since the passage of FIRREA in 1989. See
Leibold, supra note 28, at 22 (noting that there were eight depositor preference states in
1990). Nevertheless, it is predicted that the implementation of a national depositor prefer-
ence will "profoundly affect financial institutions and their creditors." Douglas, supra note
140, at 18. This is partly due to the fact that, in 1993, "few of the major state banks
[were] located in states where depositor-preference schemes [were] in place." Id.
151. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 3001.
152. See id.
153. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
155. Douglas, supra note 140, at 18; see also New Law Increases Risks to Creditors of
US Depository Institutions, INVESTORS CHRONICLE, Oct. 22, 1993, at Finance Section
[hereinafter INVESTORS CHRONICLE] ("[T]he FDIC is the primary beneficiary of the de-
positor preference provisions.").
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Creditors have therefore been dealt a double blow. First,
Congress limited creditors' claims for damages resulting from the
repudiation of contracts. Congress then ensured that creditors
would receive nothing on these truncated claims until the FDIC
had fully recovered its share. Arthur Leibold, Jr., former general
counsel for the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation,
appears to have been correct in 1990 when he stated that "the
government seems to have forsaken the goal of providing equita-
ble results for thrifts and their creditors in favor of maximizing
returns or lowering costs for itself."' 56 That observation would
become even more true with the implementation of a national de-
positor preference in 1993. According to estimates by the Con-
gressional Budget Office, depositor preference will save the
FDIC-and conversely, cost creditors-approximately $490 million
between 1994 and 1998.157
The inequity of punishing creditors who have dealt with finan-
cial institutions at arms length becomes even clearer when one
considers who is in the better position-bank regulators or credi-
tors-to monitor the behavior of depository institutions.58
[A] contracting party can look at published financial statements,
but it cannot review a bank's or thrift's loan portfolio, interview
the institution's managers, ascertain the adequacy of reserves or
make any of the myriad determinations that are possible only
with an in-depth examination of the bank or thrift. 5 9
Not only are the FDIC and RTC in a better position to monitor
the health of banks and thrifts, it is their job. The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act contains "prompt correc-
tive action" provisions, which require that the FDIC and RTC "re-
solve the problems of insured depository institutions at the least
possible long-term loss to the deposit insurance fund ... by taking
156. Leibold, supra note 28, at 22; see also Swire, supra note 47, at 520-21. "The
temptation for the [FDIC] and Congress is to push costs of the bailout off-budget and
onto third parties. These incentives to be strict lead to the suspicion that the recent
flurry of bank insolvency laws have been based more on politics than on accurate public
policy." Id.
157. INVESTORS CHRONICLE, supra note 155, at Finance Section.
158. Douglas, supra note 140, at 22.
159. Id. Douglas also notes that creditors may not even be able to rely on the pub-
lished financial statements of banks and thrifts. Id. Banks publishing high capital ratios
on their balance sheet have been known to fail. Id. Southeast Bank, N.A., for example,
was reporting $400 million in equity at the time it failed. Id.
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prompt corrective action to resolve the problems of insured depos-
itory institutions."'16 Although the agencies are required to seize
an institution before its liabilities exceeds its assets, depositor
preference creates a "cushion" that insulates the FDIC from loss if
it allows an institution's assets to deteriorate further.1 61 The
FDIC loses nothing at the point of insolvency. It is not until the
point at which assets are less than the deposit liabilities that the
FDIC shares in the loss.
IV. THE EFFECrS OF FIRREA's UNNECESSARY DAMAGE
LIMITATIONS ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
It appears that FIRREA's stringent damage provisions have
outlasted their usefulness to the FDIC. Now that the FDIC is as-
sured a full recovery on its claims before nondepositor creditors
receive anything,62 there appears to be little justification for
making creditors jump over the "actual direct compensatory dam-
ages" hurdle in order to recover. In fact, there is a good reason
for not placing a hurdle in the way of creditors' recoveries.
Inadequately compensating the creditors of banks and thrifts
increases the cost of doing business to financial institutions.' 63 If
parties contracting with financial institutions must assume the risk
that their contract rights will not be adequately protected in re-
ceivership, they will demand more favorable contract terms in re-
turn or will forego contracting with financial institutions altogeth-
er.6" In effect, contracting parties will demand to be compensat-
ed "up front" for the possibility that they will receive nothing if
the depository institution fails.65
160. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(1), (2) (1994).
161. Douglas, supra note 140, at 22.
162. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
163. See Anthony Baldo, Poof, the Claim Is Gone, FIN. WORLD, May 24, 1994, at 70,
71; Douglas, supra note 140, at 42; Swire, supra note 46, at 544-51.
164. See Douglas, supra note 140, at 22. This problem is exacerbated by two addi-
tional factors. First, because the financial statements of banks and thrifts are often unreli-
able, creditors cannot accurately assess the risks of contracting with particular institutions
and therefore pass increased costs on to both healthy and weak institutions. Id. Second,
creditors wishing to challenge the actions of the FDIC or RTC "can gain access to courts
only by bringing extraordinary suits against the government." Leibold, supra note 28, at
22.
165. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 91 (4th
ed. 1992). ("IT]he fundamental function of contract law . . . is to deter people from be-
having opportunistically toward their contracting parties, in order to encourage the opti-
mal timing of economic activity and (the same point) obviate costly self-protective mea-
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The addition of depositor preference provisions in 1993 has
greatly increased the risks associated with contracting with finan-
cial institutions.' 66 These provisions alone are guaranteed to af-
fect the way parties deal with banks and thrifts. Nevertheless, FIR-
REA's damage provisions continue to exacerbate these problems.
Creditors of financial institutions still have a stake in ensuring that
their claims survive receivership. In the best case scenario, the
assets of the receivered institution will exceed its total liabilities;
creditors could theoretically be paid in full. FIRREA's damage
limitations, however, assure that some creditors will nevertheless
receive nothing for their claims. Even when the assets of an insti-
tution do not exceed its total liabilities, creditors will receive what
remains on a pro rata basis according to their claims as long as
assets exceed deposit liabilities. 67 In addition, all creditors have
a stake in ensuring that they will be adequately compensated
should the FDIC or RTC repudiate their contract while acting as a
conservator for a troubled, but not necessarily insolvent, institu-
tion.' 68
The "prompt-corrective-action provisions,' 69 which took ef-
fect in December of 1992, are designed to ensure that the best
case scenario, in which assets of an institution seized by the FDIC
or RTC exceed its liabilities, becomes the most common scenario.
These provisions create five capital categories, with institutions
earning a rating ranging from "well-capitalized" to "critically un-
dercapitalized."' 7 Institutions are subject to varying sanctions de-
pending upon their level of capitalization, including restrictions on
distributing capital, paying management fees, opening branch offic-
es, and undertaking new lines of business.'7 Once an institution's
capital falls to 2% of its total assets, it is considered "critically
undercapitalized" and the FDIC is required to seize the institution
sures.").
166. See, e.g., INVESTORS CHRONICLE, supra note 155, at Finance Section.
167. See Douglas, supra note 140, at 22, for numerical examples of the possible recov-
eries creditors may receive.
168. Insolvency is not the only grounds for the appointment of the FDIC as receiver.
Other grounds include "[a]ny willful violation of a cease-and-desist order . . . [or] con-
cealment of the institution's books, papers, records, or assets." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5)
(D)-(E) (1994).
169. See discussion supra note 160 and accompanying text.
170. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b) (1994).
171. Id. § 1831o(d)-(i).
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within ninety days.'72 These provisions seek to ensure that "some
banks on the verge of failing [are] closed earlier" and to "encour-
age many other weak institutions to take actions on their own to
correct their deficiencies."'' The effect of these provisions will
be to increase the assets that are available to satisfy creditors'
potential claims.
Because the claims of secured creditors are not subordinated
to the claims of depositors under the 1993 depositor-preference
provisions,' 74 removal of FIRREA's damage limitations would
also create greater certainty for the secured creditors of financial
institutions. For example, a creditor, such as Unisys Corpora-
tion,'" who leases property and equipment to a financial institu-
tion would be protected by a security interest in the institution's
assets rather than unpleasantly surprised to learn that its claim has
been totally extinguished and that its security interest is worthless.
The recovery of creditors may no longer be of great importance to
the FDIC, but it is of importance to many creditors.
Courts' 76 and commentators'" have both recognized that
FIRREA's damage provisions have created uncertainty surrounding
the contracts of financial institutions that translates into higher
costs for banks and thrifts. For example, inadequately compensat-
ing plaintiffs for injuries caused by the repudiation of agreements
such as non-compete provisions will serve to decrease the value of
the assets of troubled institutions. 78 In order for troubled banks
and thrifts to maximize the return from the sale of their assets,
172. Id. § 1831o(h)(3).
173. FDIC Board Votes For Final Regulation Governing Shutdowns of Troubled Banks,
BNA BANKING DAILY, Sept. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Bankg. Library, BNABD File
(quoting Acting FDIC Chairman Andrew Hove).
174. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11)(A) (1994). "[A]mounts realized from the liquidation or
other resolution of any insured depository institution by any receiver ... shall be distrib-
uted to pay claims (other than secured claims to the extent of any such security) in the
following order of priority: . . . (ii) Any deposit liability of the institution." Id.
175. See discussion supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. FDIC, 827 F. Supp. 789, 792 (D.D.C.
1993) (noting that leaving injured parties uncompensated devalues the assets of troubled
banks), motion for recons granted in part and denied in part, 857 F. Supp. 976 (D.D.C.
1994).
177. See Baldo, supra note 163, at 71; Douglas, supra note 140, at 22; see also Swire,
supra note 46, at 544-51 (arguing that insolvency rules that favor the FDIC at the ex-
pense of other parties will affect the way in which many groups, including creditors and
bank personnel, deal with nearly insolvent banks).
178. Citibank, 827 F. Supp. at 792.
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they must often enter into ancillary agreements such as non-com-
pete agreements. If the purchasers of assets have no assurance that
their right to enforce such agreements will be protected if the in-
stitution becomes insolvent, they will be willing to purchase assets
only at a lower price. As one commentator explained in 1992,
In the face of such risks, these contract beneficiaries will have an
incentive to grab assets before insolvency, to reduce the amount
of credit extended to nearly insolvent banks, or to place a grow-
ing risk premium on doing business with the bank as it nears in-
solvency. These actions will hurt a bank's earnings, further in-
creasing the likelihood of insolvency. Contract beneficiaries will
thus contribute to the "blackhole" phenomenon of a nearly insol-
vent bank becoming insolvent.'79
The court in Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. FDIC recog-
nized these risks, stating that "[leaving such injured parties un-
compensated would greatly affect the amount that troubled, but
still solvent, banks receive for selling assets to stay afloat. The risk
of uncompensated FDIC repudiation would devalue assets and
raise the cost of bailout if the bank did not survive."'180 Whether
this court was able to fashion a remedy within FIRREA's "actual
direct compensatory" framework that will adequately compensate
Citibank is unclear. However, the court's opinion at least recog-
nizes that trampling the contract rights of creditors is counterpro-
ductive in the long run.
Likewise, disallowing recovery under severance agreements
will negatively affect the ability of financial institutions to retain
employees.' 8 ' As one commentator explained,
Banks that are restructuring also must attract and retain quality
employees. As the banking and thrift industries consolidate, every
employee can be essential to the ultimate success of a bank or
thrift. This is particularly important for institutions that are carry-
ing out restructuring programs, are subject to formal agreements
or cease and desist orders, or are under other regulatory scruti-
ny.182
179. Swire, supra note 46, at 549.
180. Citibank, 827 F. Supp. at 792.
181. Robert E. Braun, How to Bulletproof Compensation Programs, THE AM. BANK-
ER, Aug. 30, 1993, at 18.
182. Id.
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The plaintiffs in Howell v. FDIC raised these concerns, arguing
that "the disallowance of promised severance pay will mean that a
troubled bank cannot effectively contract to retain able offi-
cers.' 83 The court recognized that the plaintiffs' argument might
"have some force" but felt that their argument presented "a policy
question best left to Congress.""
As discussed previously,' 85 Congress has in fact already re-
sponded to what were viewed as excessive compensation plans for
high-level employees of bankrupt banks and thrifts by disallowing
"golden parachute" payments."8 6 However, the reasoning em-
ployed by the courts in Howell v. FDIC" and Hennessy v.
FDIC.88 reaches much further and thus interferes with
institutions' "bona fide attempts to compensate employees and
management officials on a modest but meaningful basis."'8 9
Whether or not Congress intended to disallow virtually all sever-
ance agreements, the fact remains that the courts have felt com-
pelled by FIRREA's "actual direct compensatory" language to do
so. If this was not the result that Congress intended, it could elim-
inate some confusion and relieve what has been a burden on trou-
bled banking institutions by repealing FIRREA's damage provi-
sions.
CONCLUSION
Congress is long overdue in reconsidering the wisdom of mak-
ing contract creditors bear a disproportionate share of the losses
resulting from bank failures. As one commentator has argued,
while it may "have a modestly positive budgetary impact," it will
in the long run be "bad for banks and bad for those who deal
with banks."' 9 Eliminating FIRREA's damage limitations and
183. 986 F.2d 569, 573 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Hennessy v. FDIC, 58 F.3d 908, 921
(3d Cir. 1995) ("[W]e are cognizant of the fact that disallowance of promised severance
pay may chill a troubled bank's ability to effectively retain able employees.").
184. Howell, 986 F.2d at 574.
185. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
186. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(k) (1994).
187. 986 F.2d at 569.
188. 58 F.3d at 908.
189. Braun, supra note 181, at 19.
190. Douglas, supra note 140, at 22; see also Swire, supra note 46, at 556 ("At a
minimum, the agencies should be required to make fresh showings that the rules are well
tailored to actual problems and are not political efforts to avoid blame for the bailout.").
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leaving the depositor preference provisions in place will admittedly
leave the lion's share of these problems unaddressed. Eliminating
these limits will, however, serve a mitigating purpose and remove
a relic that has been a source of frustration for both courts and
creditors.
